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ARBITRARY DETENTION? THE
IMMIGRATION DETENTION BED
QUOTA
ANITA SINHA*
ABSTRACT
When President Obama took office in 2009, Congress through
appropriations linked the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s
(DHS) funding to “maintaining” 33,400 immigration detention beds a
day. This provision, what this Article refers to as the bed quota, remains
in effect, except now the mandate is 34,000 beds a day. Since 2009, DHS
detentions of non-citizens have gone up by nearly 25 percent. To
accommodate for this significant spike over a relatively short period of
time, the federal government has relied considerably on private prison
corporations to build and operate immigration detention facilities.
This Article takes a comprehensive look at the Congressional
immigration detention bed quota. It details its legislative history, and the
relationship between the quota and private prisons in the immigration
detention system. It situates the provision in a conversation about quotas
generally, both in the law enforcement context and also in relation to the
significance of quotas in U.S. immigration law historically. The Article
then examines the bed quota through the lens of foundational as well as
present-day jurisprudence on immigration detention and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It also

Copyright © 2017 Anita Sinha.
*
Assistant Professor of Law and Director, International Human Rights Law Clinic, American
University, Washington College of Law. For helpful conversations and comments, I am grateful
to Muneer Ahmad, Susan Carle, Janie Chuang, Elizabeth Keyes, Annie Lai, Binny Miller, and
Jayesh Rathod. I would like to thank the participants in the Crimmigration Lecture Series,
especially César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández and Christopher Lasch. I also greatly benefitted
from the feedback I received from participants in the LatCrit Critical Constitutionalism
conference and the Clinical Law Review Workshop. Thanks also to Juliana Perez Calle, Kamille
Go, and Christina Moerhrle for their fantastic research assistance. Lastly, I am grateful to the
phenomenal students of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, in particular
Priya Khangura and Trey O’Callaghan. All errors are my own. I dedicate this Article to Savi the
fighter and his co-warriors Marcel and Rachid.

SINHA FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

78

3/6/2017 1:39 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12:2

analyzes the quota through international human rights law, particularly
the protections related to arbitrary detention and vulnerable migrants.
The Article concludes with policy considerations that caution against
Congress imposing the immigration detention bed quota.
INTRODUCTION
Thirty years of failed federal immigration law reform efforts have
changed the way U.S. immigration policies are made. Rather than doing
nothing about the approximately eleven million undocumented
immigrants living in the country,1 entities beyond the federal legislative
branch have gotten involved in the regulation and enforcement of
immigration. In fact, “the great bulk of contemporary immigration
policymaking stems not from Congress, but rather from executive
branch agencies and states.”2
This modern version of American immigration policymaking raises
novel questions as to which governing bodies can, or from a public
policy perspective should, regulate and enforce immigration laws. One
set of inquiries involves states legislating immigration control
measures,3 a type of contemporary immigration policymaking.4 The
1. Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/24/5-factsabout-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/.
2. Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power to
Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 692 (2014).
3. See Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption Analysis of
Sub-Federal Immigration Laws: The California TRUST Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 481 (2015)
(describing the trend of state laws seeking to regulate immigration as “sub-federal immigration
laws”), Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment of Transition: State Officials, the Federal Government, and
the Formation of American Immigration Policy, 99 J. AM. HIST. 1092 (2013) (stating that prior to
the late 1800s, before the creation of federal immigration law, immigration regulation and
enforcement was a matter of state law, but for a brief period in in the late 18th century), Gerald
L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833, 1881 (1993) (“[T]he federal government briefly entered the alien regulation business in
1798.”); see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB
1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749 (2011) (describing how Arizona, despite formal prohibition on state
and local immigration regulation, prosecutes immigration-related crimes, and arguing how
through local prosecutors, the state is nonetheless restructuring the federal system for punishing
immigration crime).
4. See Ian Gordon & Tasmeen Raja, 164 Anti-Immigration Laws Passed Since 2010? A
Mojo Analysis, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 2012) (showing that the height of state anti-immigration
laws was 2010-2011, when 164 such laws were passed), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/
2012/03/anti-immigration-law-database; see also Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1339 (2013) (arguing that state immigration laws are enacted less for their impact
and more for shaping federal immigration policy making); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of
Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 493 (2001) (arguing that the devolution of immigration authority to states by Congress
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most prominent example is Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement
and Safe Neighborhoods Act, commonly referred to as S.B. 1070. The
U.S. Supreme Court in 2012 struck down three of the statute’s four
provisions challenged by the Obama Administration.5 The Court
withheld judgment on the constitutionality of S.B. 1070’s “show your
papers” or “papers please” provision,6 which requires police officers to
determine the immigration status of any person they lawfully stop,
detain, or arrest if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.”7 Since the Arizona
v. United States decision, restrictive immigration state laws have been
on the downturn.8
The other recent manifestation of contemporary immigration
policy making is executive orders, namely Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) announced by President Obama in June
2012, and expanded DACA and Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) announced in
November 2014.9 The second executive actions were enjoined by the

contradicts the notion of sovereignty and thus should not receive the deference granted
traditionally to federal immigration law).
5. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. _ (2012). For a summary of the decision, see David
Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41 (2012).
6. Adam Liptak, Blocking Parts of Arizona Law, Justices Allow Its Centerpiece, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/supreme-court-rejects-part-ofarizona-immigration-law.html?_r=0; see also Hardy Haberman, ‘Your Papers Please!’, DALLAS
VOICE (May 6, 2010, 2:39 PM), http://www.dallasvoice.com/your-papers-please-1020702.html
(linking Arizona’s law with the phrase “your papers please” used in Nazi Germany).
7. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012). In 2013, the Arizona Civil Rights Advisory
Board heard from undocumented immigrants testifying on the negative impact the “show me your
papers” provision has had on the community. Valeria Fernández, Three Years After Passing Its
“Papers, Please” Law, Arizona Is Divided by Distrust and Fear, ALTERNET (Mar. 29, 2013),
http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/three-years-after-passing-its-papers-please-law-arizonadivided-distrust-and-fear. In 2014, the Obama Administration agreed to drop their challenge of
this provision. Howard Fischer, Brewer, Feds Cut Deal on SB1070’s “Papers Please” Provision,
ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (June 10, 2014, 7:56 AM), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2014/06/10/ azsb1070-jan-brewer-deal-on-papers-please-provision/.
8. Catalina Restrepo, Annual Review of State-Level Immigration Policy Still Trending ProImmigrant, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Aug. 11, 2015),
http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/08/11/state-immigration-laws-2015/. For additional analysis
of the Arizona v. United States decision, see, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and
the Limits of State Power: Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1 (2013);
Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV.
31 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision made the case as much about separation of
powers than about federalism). For a perspective arguing that SB 1070 was a constitutional state
legislative act, see Calvin L. Lewis et al., Why Arizona Senate Bill 1070 is Constitutional and Not
Preempted by Federal Law, 89 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 283 (2012).
9. Jennifer G. Parser & David L. Woodard, President Obama’s Executive Action on
Immigration Policy, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
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Southern District of Texas,10 on the grounds that the programs exceed
the President’s immigration power.11 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s decision.12 This case then went up to the Supreme
Court,13 and in June of 2016, the Supreme Court in a 4-4 tie failed to
provide guidance on the proper allocation of immigration powers
between the Executive and Congress.14
This Article circles back to a traditional site of immigration
policymaking, namely Congress, to examine the extent to which the
Legislature can prescribe the Executive branch’s enforcement of
immigration law. Importantly, it does so taking into account the context
of modern immigration policymaking. The federal legislative act that is
the inquiry of this Article is the immigration detention bed quota
Congress mandates through the U.S. Department of Homeland
president-obama-s-executive-action-immigration-policy. While the trend of state anti-immigrant
laws has reversed after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona v. United States, those who
supported both sides claimed the Supreme Court’s decision was a victory. See Kerry Abrams,
Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 602 (2013).
10. The decision by the court to apply the injunction nation-wide is being challenged in
Complaint, Batalla Vidal v. Baran et. al., No. 16-cv-04756 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016). The Plaintiff
in Batalla applied and was granted a three-year period of deferred action and employment
authorization based on expanded DACA, Complaint at ¶ 32. However, in May 2015 Defendants
revoked his three-year employment authorization after the issuance of the preliminary injunction
in Texas v. United States, and issued him a two-year employment authorization, Complaint at ¶
38. The Plaintiff asks the court to declare that the preliminary injunction entered in Texas v.
United States. does not apply to New York residents based on arguments including the Texas
District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over residents of New York, see Complaint at ¶43, ¶44, and
that the revocation of Plaintiff’s employment authorization document violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), see Complaint at ¶ 58.
11. Kevin Johnson, Symposium: United States v. Texas - The Road to Perpetual Immigration
Gridlock, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 11, 2016, 9:52 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/
symposium-united-states-v-texas-the-road-to-perpetual-immigration-gridlock/;
Jennifer
G.
Parser, DAPA and DACA: What Happened to President Obama’s Executive Action?, THE NAT’L
L. REV. (July 25, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/ article/dapa-and-daca-what-happened-topresident-obama-s-executive-action.
12. United States v. Texas, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015).
13. United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. ___ (2016). The Department of Justice unsuccessfully
petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to lift the injunction.
14. For different viewpoints on the constitutionality of the November 2014 executive
actions, see, e.g., Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action,
Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1183 (2015) (arguing that DAPA
exceeds the President’s authority); Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II:
Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 213 (2015) (analyzing DAPA through
the Take Care Clause and arguing that DAPA falls within the President’s powers and duty to
execute the laws of Congress); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care
Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013) (addressing the original DACA program created by the
Executive in 2012 and arguing “that the Constitution’s Take Care Clause imposes on the
President a duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress . . . . [and so] there is simply
no general presidential nonenforcement power.”).
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Security’s (DHS) appropriations process.15 The provision was first
introduced when President Obama took office in 2009, and ties DHS’s
funding to maintaining a minimum number of detention beds per day.16
The quota, initially 33,400 beds, today sets the daily minimum number
of immigration detention beds DHS shall maintain at 34,000.17 This
Article explores the legality of the detention bed quota, namely
whether the quota violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and international
human rights law limitations on arbitrary detention.
There are also policy considerations that this Article will explore
with relation to the detention bed quota. First, law enforcement quotas
generally contravene agency or individual officers’ discretion in a
manner that is not in the best interest of society.18 A long-standing part
of the immigration enforcement regime has been prosecutorial
discretion, specifically that “[a] favorable exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in immigration law identifies the agency’s authority to
refrain from asserting the fully scope of the agency’s enforcement
authority.”19 The Supreme Court’s deadlock in United States v. Texas
leaves in place the lower court’s injunction of the Executive’s DAPA
and expanded DACA programs.20 In doing so, it remains unresolved
whether the President’s power of prosecutorial discretion in
immigration law includes the authority to create such programs.21 While
15. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39,
43 (2015). See also Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom,
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2013) (“We know ICE can fill more than 34,000 beds, so why would
they use less?’ said [John] Culberson [R-TX], a member of the House Homeland Security
appropriations subcommittee, which ties ICE funding to its compliance with the mandate.”),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-detentionboom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html.
16. Philip L. Torrey, Immigration Detention’s Unfounded Bed Mandate, in IMMIGRATION
BRIEFINGS 5 (Apr. 2015).
17. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39,
43 (2015).
18. The prosecutorial discretion power in the immigration context is distinct from that in
the criminal context, the latter which has been criticized as perpetuating systemic racial
disparities. See Angela J. Davis, In Search for Racial Justice: The Role of the Prosecutor, 16 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2013).
19. SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7 (2015) (showing that the Executive has
applied this discretion, historically and in recent times, to both individual and groups).
20. Mark Joseph Stern, In a Tied Vote, the Supreme Court Blocks Obama’s Immigration
Actions, SLATE (June 23, 2016, 11:11 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/06/23/
united_states_v_texas_ties_obama_immigration_executive_actions_blocked.html.
21. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Symposium: A Meditation on History, Law, and Loss,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2016, 2:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-ameditation-on-history-law-and-loss/.
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it is still an open question for some whether the President should be
able to implement these deferred action programs, the judicial impasse
in United States v. Texas does not implicate the Executive’s longstanding discretion over immigration enforcement. As such, agency
discretion over non-citizen removal and detention remains both an
important component of modern immigration policymaking and, more
specifically, a crucial consideration when examining the Congressional
immigration bed quota.
Second, quotas generally have demonstratively compelled action
that runs counter to core democratic principles of non-discrimination
and the deprivation of liberty interests as a last resort. For example,
enforcement quotas have been linked to police officers using racial
profiling.22 The immigration bed quota specifically delinks detention
decisions from individualized determinations concerning public safety.
As articulated by a former Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) director:
Having a mandate out there that says you have to detain a certain
number – regardless of how many folks are a public safety threat or
threaten the integrity of the system – doesn’t seem to make a lot of
sense. You need the numbers to drive the detention needs, not set
an arbitrary number that then drives your operation.23

The Congressional bed quota has resulted in unprecedented
detention numbers.24 Since 2009, “the number of non-citizens DHS
detains yearly has increased by nearly 25 percent.”25 And this practice
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. Banking on Detention: Local Lockup Quotas & the Immigrant Dragnet, DETENTION
WATCH NETWORK & CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 2 (2015) [hereinafter DWN/CCR
Report] (quoting former ICE Director John Sandweg in a September 2013 interview with
Bloomberg).
24. Some have in fact attributed the expansion of the immigration detention system to the
Congressional bed quota. See, e.g., CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ,
CRIMMIGRATION LAW 242 (2015) (“Aside from the many statutes that authorize or require
detention . . . the size of today’s civil immigration detention estate can be attributed to a
congressional directive known as the ‘bed mandate.’”).
25. Mark Noferi, Immigration Detention: Behind the Record Numbers, CENTER FOR
MIGRATION STUDIES (2014), http://cmsny.org/immigration-detention-behind-the-recordnumbers/. The average daily population increased almost five-fold between 1995 and 2011. See
Doris Meissner et. al, Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable
Machinery, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 11 (the increase being from 7,475 to 33,330 detainees
in ICE custody per day). According to the most recent DHS annual report available, in 2013 ICE
detained 440,557 individuals. See John F. Simanski, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2013, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 6 (Sept. 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. The 2013
figure was about 8% below the record-breaking number of detentions in Fiscal Year 2012, when
477,000 individuals were in ICE custody. See DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23 at 1. The number
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comes at a considerable price. Generally, with regard to immigration
enforcement, “[t]he US government spends more on its immigration
enforcement agencies than on all its other principal criminal federal
law enforcement agencies combined.”26 The expenditure of these funds
for detention largely lines the pockets of for-profit corporations,
because more than half of immigration detention beds are operated by
private prison corporations.27 The profits generated by these
corporations’ immigration detention operations grew after Congress
passed the bed quota.28 And the lobbying expenditures by these prison
companies, including those spent on Congress members on the
Appropriations Committee,29 has ensured that the spike in detention
beds remains the status quo.
One could argue that just because Congress requires that DHS
“maintain” a specific number of beds does not mean that the Executive
needs to fill them. This is not the view of certain legislators and DHS
officials. One of the most recent examples is statements made by
Representative John Culberson (R-TX), who said, “he expects the
Obama Administration to find enough illegal immigrants to fill the
detention beds Congress funds—or face budgetary consequences.”30
Moreover, corporations with whom the agency contracts to operate
over half of the detention system often get paid regardless of whether
the beds are occupied.31 In any case, an interpretation of the statutory
language of the bed quota as only requiring the agency to ensure 34,000
beds are available per day (not filled) is still troubling from a policy
perspective.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the legislative
history of Congress’s inclusion of the immigration bed quota in the

of noncitizens detained in 2012 was more than double the number of individuals detained by ICE
in 2001, see Stakeholder Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review 22nd Session
of the Working Group on the UPR Human Rights Council, THE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS & DETENTION WATCH NETWORK 9 (Apr.-May 2015), http://www.theadvocatesfor
humanrights.org/uploads/us_hrc_-_migrant_detention_-_sept_2014_2.pdf.
26. Meissner et al., supra note 25, at 9 (emphasis in original).
27. DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23, at 1. Sixty-two percent of immigration detention beds
are operated by private prison corporations. Moreover, many government-owned immigration
detention facilities use “privately contracted detention-related services such as food, security, and
transportation.” Id.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 83–85.
30. Sarah Chacko, Administration Warned to Keep Detention Beds Full, CQ ROLL CALL,
2015 WL 1964623 (2015).
31. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007).

SINHA FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

84

3/6/2017 1:39 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12:2

DHS Appropriations bill, including opposition to the measure by both
Congress members and civic society. It weaves in both private prison
corporations and the role that quotas have played in law enforcement
generally, and in particular U.S. immigration law. Part II begins with a
Due Process analysis of the Congressional immigration detention bed
quota under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It
summarizes the historical and current jurisprudence of due process
limitations on immigration detention and examines how the bed quota
fares. Part II also applies international human rights law implicated by
Congress’s imposition of a detention quota. Part III raises policy
considerations relevant to both the relationship between Congress and
the Executive branch on the issue of immigration enforcementand
American society at large.
I. BACKGROUND
The immigration enforcement scheme, including detention, is a
civil, not criminal, system.32 This distinction, however, is virtually a legal
fiction.33 Immigration detention facilities, even those holding women
and children, look and operate like prisons.34 DHS contracts with
prisons and jails, and so immigration and criminal detainees are also
held together, side by side in the same facilities.35
Since the creation of the modern federal immigration system in
1965 with the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act

32. See Subhash Kateel & Aarti Shahani, Families for Freedom Against Deportation and
Delegalization, in KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT TODAY 263 (David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas, ed., 2008) (“On the
books, detention and deportation are civil—rather than criminal—processes run by the executive
branch, not punishments given by the judiciary. For most detainees, it means that you are held
like a prisoner without the niceties of the criminal justice system.”).
33. Juliet P. Stumpf, Civil Detention and Other Oxymorons, 40 QUEENS L.J. 55 (2014).
34. Raul A. Reyes, America’s Shameful “Prison Camps”, CNN (July 23, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/23/opinions/reyes-immigration-detention/.
35. See Abira Ashfaq, Invisible Removal, Endless Detention, Limited Relief: A Taste of
Immigration Court Representation for Detained Noncitizens, in KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TODAY 199 (David C. Brotherton
& Philip Kretsedemas, ed., 2008) (describing immigrant detainees held in county jails: “You obey
the rules of the jail. The jail guards treat you like any other prisoner. The administration gives
you a number, a bed and a commode, and library hours just like any other prisoner. In fact, you
are worse off because you cannot participate in the educational programs county inmates can
participate in.”); see also Sarah Dávila-Ruhaak, ICE’s New Policy on Segregation and the
Continuing Use of Solitary Confinement Within the Context of International Human Rights, 47 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1433, 1439 (2014) (“The reality of immigration detention is, however,
critically intertwined with the criminal penal system. Immigrant detainees are held in the same
facilities as criminally convicted persons and subject to similar, if not the same, treatment.”).

SINHA FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

3/6/2017 1:39 PM

ARBITRARY DETENTION

85

(INA), detention was not a significant or even active component of
immigration enforcement.36 Today, however, this history is barely
believable, as the detention of non-citizens in the United States is
currently the country’s largest detention system.37 The most recent
chapter of this story involves Congress’s immigration detention bed
quota.
The immigration detainee population, which was already on the
steady rise, increased by twenty five percent after Congress included
the quota in DHS’s appropriations in 2009.38 Former New York District
Attorney Robert Morgenthau, amongst others,39 ascribes the
unprecedented immigration detention numbers to the detention bed
quota in DHS’ appropriations bill:
On any given day, Immigration and Customs Enforcement keeps at
least 34,000 immigrants locked up while they wait for their cases to
be heard in immigration court. Many of these detainees are
incarcerated not because they are dangerous or likely to skip their
court dates, but because ICE must meet an arbitrary quota set by
Congress.40

Morgenthau points out that the immigration detention bed quota is
starkly unique: “No other federal or state agency is required by law to
detain a specific number of people without any regard to whether the
quota makes sense from a law-enforcement perspective.”41 The
detention of immigrants currently costs over 2 billion dollars per year,
which provides a considerable financial incentive for both private
prison companies and local governments looking to pull in revenue for
struggling state, county, and municipal budgets.42
This Part presents the legislative history of the bed quota, including
considerable opposition to the measure. It then links the bed quota to
the prevalence of private prison corporations in the immigration
detention system, and concludes with an examination of quotas from
36. Anita Sinha, Slavery by Another Name, “Voluntary” Detainee Labor and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 11 STAN.J C.R.&C.L. 1, 8–9 (2015).
37. David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 157, 182 (2012).
38. See Noferi, supra note 25.
39. See GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 24.
40. Robert M. Morgenthau, The US Keeps 34,000 Immigrants in Detention Each Day Simply
to Meet a Quota, THE NATION (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/us-keeps-34000immigrants-detention-each-day-simply-meet-quota/.
41. Id.
42. Detention Quotas, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://www.detentionwatch
network.org/issues/detention-quotas.
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the perspective of law enforcement generally, and within the historical
context of immigration law specifically.
A. The Bed Quota’s Legislative History
The immigration detention bed quota is a product of one line in
DHS’s custody operations budget. That line, inserted by Congress for
the first time43 in DHS’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget, reads: “Provided
further, [t]hat funding made available under this heading shall maintain
a level of not less than 33,400 detention beds through September 30,
2010.”44 The number of beds increased to 34,000 in 2012,45 which is the
number contained in the last DHS Appropriations bill passed in July of
2015.46
The legislative movement culminating in this bed quota began in
the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.47 In 2004, Congress passed
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), which
was the first mandate for a stated number of immigration detention
beds.48 Although a precursor to today’s bed quota, IRTPA was different
because it directed DHS to increase the “number of beds available for
immigration detention.”49 The legislation also required that the
expansion of immigration detention bed capacity be contingent on “the
availability of appropriated funds.”50
The immigration detention bed quota that operates today was
introduced during President Obama’s first year in office by the late
Democratic Senator Robert Byrd from West Virginia, then Chairman
43. In some sources, the bed mandate is stated to appear first in 2007. See, e.g., Esther Yu
Hsi Lee, Homeland Security Head Insists ‘Bed Mandate’ is Not a Quota to Fill Detention Centers,
THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2014/03/12/3391911/jehjohnson-bed-mandate-quota/. The FY 2007 DHS budget did add new appropriations to increase
the agency’s capacity to detain individuals, but it does not precisely relate to the quota that first
appears in the FY 2009 DHS budget. See Torrey, supra note 16, at 4 (“The FY 2007 DHS budget
increased the agency’s custody operations budget by $400 million, which was enough money for
6,700 more beds and a total detention capacity of 27,5000 beds.”).
44. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123
Stat. 2149 (2009).
45. While Congress in 2011 failed to pass a DHS appropriations bill, it increased the
immigration bed quota to 34,000 by passing the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011. See
Torrey supra note 16, at 6.
46. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-215, 129 Stat.
39, 43 (2015).
47. Torrey, supra note 16, at 3.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The Bush Administration consistently pushed for increased immigration detention
bed capacity, ultimately increasing the total DHS detention capacity to 33,400.
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of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security.51
Speaking on behalf of Senator Byrd,52 Illinois Democratic Senator
Richard Durbin presented the five goals that Senator Byrd had for the
new provision:
No. 1, securing our borders and enforcing our immigration laws; No.
2, protecting the American people from terrorist threats and other
vulnerabilities; No. 3, preparing and responding to all hazards,
including natural disasters; No. 4, supporting our State, local, tribal
and private sector partners in homeland security with resources and
information; and finally, giving the Department the management
tools it needs to succeed.53

These stated objectives, however, do not tell the whole story.
Congress’s switch from legislating for increased immigration detention
capacity to a detention quota was not happenstance—it came at a time
when a new, Democratic President announced that he would be more
focused on the country’s economic recession than immigration policy.54
On the one hand, this meant that comprehensive immigration reform
would be unlikely, but on the other hand, detaining non-citizens may
provide for jobs.55 It also was a time, likely because of the recession,
when the U.S. was experiencing “a multi-year decline in the
undocumented immigration population.”56 From a fiscal policy
perspective, it seems peculiar that Congress would mandate such high
detention rates at taxpayers’ expense when unauthorized migration

51. It should be noted that Senator Byrd had a significantly racialized political and
legislative past, including with the Klu Klux Klan and voting against the 1965 Civil Rights Act.
See Eric Pianin, A Senator’s Shame, WASH. POST (June 19, 2005), http://www.washington
post.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/18/AR2005061801105.html.
52. Senator Byrd was seriously ill, which is why Senator Durbin spoke on his behalf, see
Torrey, supra note 16, at 5.
53. Christina Elhaddad, Note, Bed Time for the Bed Mandate: A Call for Administrative
Immigration Reform, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 32, 34 (2014), (citing 155 CONG. REC. S7164
(July 7, 2009) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin)); William Selway & Margaret Newkirk,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0924/congress-fuels-private-jails-detaining-34-000-immigrants (quoting a former aide to Senator
Byrd who stated that “[t]he senator wanted to ensure that cost increases wouldn’t lead ICE to
fund fewer beds”).
54. Torrey, supra note 16, at 4.
55. See Ginger Thompson & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Set for First Step on
Immigration Reform, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/
us/politics/25immig.html (“The unemployment rate is expected to stay high, making Democrats
who are wavering on immigration reform leery of supporting it.”).
56. Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private Prison Profit
With an Immigrant Detention Quota, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP (Apr. 2015), http://grassroots
leadership.org/reports/payoff-how-congress-ensures-private-prison-profit-immigrant-detentionquota.
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had fallen by more than fifty percent since the recession began.57 In
fact, Representative David Price, the then-Chair of the House
Committee on Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee,
reportedly tried to prevent the quota’s inclusion, stating later that
“[i]t’s not just pressure, . . . [i]t’s a requirement that [DHS] choose one
course rather than the other, when the alternatives to detention would
be less expensive and equally effective.”58
1. Opposition to the Bed Quota
Advocacy groups have had a steadfast focus on eliminating the
immigration detention bed quota. In particular, Grassroots Leadership,
Detention Watch Network, and the Center for Constitutional Rights
have presented how the quota is inextricably linked to private prison
corporate interests.59 In 2014, over one hundred non-governmental
organizations submitted a letter to Congress stating, inter alia, that
ICE’s daily detention level should be determined only by actual need
and that the quota is contrary to proven best practices in law
enforcement.60 In 2013, a significant faction of Congress also raised
their concerns. Sixty-five members of Congress signed a letter to the
White House in opposition to the bed quota, characterizing the
provision as compromising the agency’s “ability to satisfy its stated
enforcement priorities and accomplish detention reform[,]” contrary to
constitutionally protected due process protections, and a waste of
taxpayer dollars.61
In 2012 the House Committee on Appropriations issued a report
on the FY 2013 proposed budget that recommended that Congress
raise the detention bed quota from 33,400 to 34,000 beds. The House
at this time was controlled by Republicans, and the “minority views”
section of the report, i.e. by the Democratic members, voiced a different
perspective. This section was entitled “Burdensome Immigration
Provisions,” and stated that “the use of those beds should be
determined by the enforcement actions and judgment of ICE on

57. See Selway & Newkirk, supra note 53.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Grassroots Leadership supra note 56; DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23.
60. Letter to Congress Members, Immigration detention bed mandate in FY 2015
DHS Appropriations (Jan. 24, 2014), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/
FINAL%20NGO%20sign-on%20bed%20mandate%20-%20Congress%201.24.14_1.pdf.
61. Letter to President Obama from Members of Congress (Sept. 25, 2013),
http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/2013_09_25%20Deutch%20Foster%
20Bed%20Mandate%20Letter%20to%20Obama.pdf.
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whether detention is required for particular detainees.”62 It concludes
by stating: “We are unaware of any other law enforcement agency with
a statutory requirement to detain no less than a certain number of
individuals on a daily basis.”63
In 2013, two representatives introduced an amendment to the DHS
Appropriations Act of 2014 that would have removed the bed quota.
Representative Ted Deutch, one of the amendment’s co-sponsors, said
this: “Arbitrary quotas that dictate how many people to keep in jail
each day have no place in law enforcement . . . . The detention bed
mandate forces immigration enforcement officials to focus on filling
beds in expensive private detention facilities at the expense of
taxpayers and hardworking, decent families.”64 The amendment failed
232 to 190, with the votes largely casted along party lines.65 The
following term, sixty members of Congress signed a letter urging for
the end of the detention bed quota.66
During this time, the Obama Administration stated the quota was
about 2,000 more beds than it deems necessary, which critics of the
quota pointed out “represent[s] an added cost of about $132 million a
year.”67 Notably, in each of the five years since Congress included the
quota into DHS’s annual appropriations, President Obama’s proposed
budgets have never included the bed mandate language.68 In fact, in one
year—in 2014 for FY 2015—the President’s budget request included a
request to eliminate the quota, stating the number of beds maintained
should be based on actual need.69
Facing the threat of a government shut-down, ICE in 2013 released
2,228 detainees to save costs.70 This action was immediately

62. Torrey, supra note 16, at 6.
63. Id.
64. Foster, Deutch Efforts to end Immigrant Detention Bed Mandate, TIMES WEEKLY (Dec.
16, 2014, 9:21 PM), http://thetimesweekly.com/news/2014/dec/16/foster-deutch-efforts-endimmigrant-detention-bed-/.
65. See Selway & Newkirk, supra note 53.
66. Katharina Obser, The Outdated Immigrant Detention System, THE HILL (Oct. 18, 2013,
6:00
PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/329325-the-outdated-immigrantdetention-system.
67. Andy Sullivan, Insight: Congress Keeps Detention Quota Despite Immigration Debate,
REUTERS (July 8, 2013, 5:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/08/us-usa-immigrationdetention-insight-idUSBRE96711920130708.
68. President Obama’s FY 2013 and 2014 proposed budgets requested a reduction in
detention capacity. See Torrey, supra note 16, at 6–7.
69. Bessie Muñoz, Immigrants for Sale: Corporate America Puts a Price Tag on Sexual
Abuse, 17 SCHOLAR 553, 563 (2015).
70. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103
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reprimanded by the House of Representative’s then-Chair to the
Homeland Security Committee as a “clear violation of statute,”71 a
reference to the bed quota in DHS’s Appropriations bill. The agency
was summoned to Congress to explain its actions. During this April
2013 Congressional hearing, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano
called the quota “artificial” and stated that lowering the quota would
allow the agency to provide alternatives to detention for low-risk, nonU.S. citizens facing removal: “We ought to be detaining according to
our priorities, according to public-safety threats, level of offense and
the like, . . . not an arbitrary bed number.”72
Two years later, however, a Congressional appropriations
committee member suggested doubling down on the bed quota. During
an April 2015 hearing on the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
budget, Representative John Culberson (R-TX), after a heated back
and forth with then-ICE director Sarah Saldana, suggested that the
current language in the DHS appropriations bill should be amended to
substitute the word “maintain” with “fill.”73
Representative Culberson’s comment demonstrates how, despite
the formidable opposition to the bed quota, proponents steadfastly
support the provision as a key component of DHS’s appropriations.
Private prison corporations, the main benefactors of the bed quota, are
a significant part of the reason why.
B. The Detention Bed Quota and Prison Corporation Profits
The private prison industry has a dominating presence in the U.S.
immigration detention system, a fact inextricably related to the
immigration detention bed quota. Corporate control over much of
immigration detention is a phenomenon that emerged in the criminal
justice context, amidst the political climate of the 1980s marked by the
“War on Drugs.”74 With waning opportunities to maximize its profits in
CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1500 (2015) (stating that even though “ICE conducted public safety and flight
risk assessments and released only those presenting a low probability of both risks,” Republican
congress members publicly accused the agency for releasing criminals and endangering
Americans).
71. See Selway & Newkirk, supra note 53.
72. Id. (“In 2009, the year Congress set the bed quota, as many as 25 lobbyists represented
[CCA] on budget and appropriations issues, according to filings with Congress.”).
73. Budget Hearing on Immigration and Customs Enforcement Before the Subcomm. on
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://appropriations.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=394119.
74. See Cody Mason, Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT 1 (July 19, 2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/dollars-
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the criminal justice setting, the 9/11 terror attacks opened the door for
the private prison industry to see its next market share in the
immigration detention business. This is because the policies that
comprised the “War on Terror” involved heightened enforcement
against non-citizens, including detention. It is important to note,
however, that the majority of immigration detention beds were turned
over to these for-profit entities for reasons other than their track
record:
For-profit prisons did not enter the immigrant detention business
based on a track record of successfully providing detention services.
The rise of this industry has been attributed to a combination of
factors, including the trend toward privatization of government
services, the ability of private contractors to create detention
capacity more rapidly than government . . . , rising demand for
detention and prison beds . . . , and the lack of accountability to
DHS-ICE by state and local contractors.75

The first privately owned immigration detention facility was
opened in 1984 by Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),76 and
the GEO Group (GEO) received its first immigrant detention contract
in 1987.77 The era described as the “War on Immigrants”78 brought
about by the legislative criminalization of immigrants created the
opportunity for private companies to get into the business of
incarcerating immigrants. Today, private companies operate sixty-two
and-detainees-the-growth-of-for-profit-detention/ (“The War on Drugs and harsh sentencing
laws led to explosive growth in state and federal prison populations in the 1980s. The massive rise
in prisoners overwhelmed government budgets and resources, and created opportunities for
private prison companies to flourish. In 2010, one in every 13 prisoners in the U.S. was held by
for-profit companies.”).
75. Unlocking Human Dignity: A Plan to Transform the U.S. Immigrant Detention System,
U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS & CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES 25–26 (2015),
http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-and-refugee-services/upload/unlocking-humandignity.pdf.
76. Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics,
Profit, and the Meaning of “Custody,” 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 899 (2015). Recently, CCA
announced a company name change to “CoreCivic,” “Corrections Corporation of America
Rebrands as CoreCivic.” See Bethany Davis, Corrections Corporation of America Rebrands as
CoreCivic, INSIDECCA, (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.cca.com/insidecca/correctionscorporation-of-America-rebrands-as-corecivic. However, this Article will refer to the company as
CCA.
77. Unlocking Human Dignity: A Plan to Transform the U.S. Immigration Detention System,
CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES & U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS 25 (2015),
http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-and-refugee-services/upload/unlocking-humandignity.pdf.
78. See Cheryl Little, The War on Immigrants: Stories from the Front Lines, AMERICAS
QUARTERLY (Summer 2008), http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/305 (“The U.S.
Government’s War on Terror has transgressed into a War on Immigrants.”).
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percent of the immigration detention beds79 and run nine out of ten of
the largest immigration detention centers.80
The bed quota has been linked to the fact that detention costs for
undocumented immigrants have more than doubled since 2006, to the
present figure of $2.8 billion annually.81 Detention costs have steadily
increased despite the fact that the unauthorized entry at the U.S. border
have dropped by two-thirds.82 Correspondingly, the private
corporations’ profits have soared. CCA and GEO have expanded their
share of the private immigrant detention industry from thirty seven to
forty five percent in 2014, and have experienced dramatic profit
increases: CCA’s profits increased from $133,373,000 in 2007, to
$195,022,000 in 2014, and GEO’s profits increased 244 percent.83
Morgenthau explains the illogical story told by these statistics by
casting the bed quota alongside corporate interests: “The persistence
of th[e] detainee quota is less surprising in light of the fact that forprofit private prisons hold more than half of all immigration
detainees.”84
One explanation for the bed quota’s endurance is that it is linked
to Congress members’ concerns about maintaining the flow of money
and jobs into their states and districts.85 An explicit example is a
question during the March 2013 House Judiciary Committee hearing
posed by Pennsylvania Republican Representative Tom Marino, to
then-ICE director Morton: “Why not take advantage—more
advantage—of facilities like this [where it costs $82.50 per day per
detainee], and particularly in Pike County [Pennsylvania], who built a
whole new facility just to house these individuals?”86
The other way in which profit-driven interests help make sense of
the bed quota’s persistence relates to the private prison industry’s

79. See Carson & Diaz, supra note 56.
80. Id.
81. See Sullivan, supra note 67.
82. Id.
83. Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private Prison Profit
with an Immigrant Detention Quota 4 (Apr. 2015), http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/
files/reports/quota_report_final_digital.pdf.
84. See Morgenthau, supra note 40.
85. Id.; see also Hernández, supra note 70, at 1509 (pointing out that local governments also
profit from immigration detention, noting that “immigration prisons are particularly attractive to
local political leaders because the federal government pays almost all of the costs of detention.”).
86. William Selway & Margaret Newkirk, Congress’s Illegal-Immigration Detention Quota
Costs $2 Billion a Year, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2013, 8:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/new
s/articles/2013-09-26/congresss-illegal-immigration-detention-quota-costs-2-billion-a-year.
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spending.87 The two corporations that have come to operate most of the
immigration detention beds companies have considerable lobbying
expenditures: CCA has spent over $13 million on lobbyists since 2005,
including lobbying staff for the Senate Appropriations Committee.88
During this same period, GEO spent more than $2.8 million on
lobbying efforts.89
Professor Philip Torrey demonstratedthat for-profit prison
companies’ lobbying and campaign contributions seemed to have paid
off. One example is in 2005, when the industry spent about $5 million
dollars, and then “[o]ver the next two years, ICE’s budget jumped from
$3.5 billion to $4.7 billion.”90 By 2012, for-profit prison companies held
federal contracts worth approximately $5.1 billion.91 Representative
Adam Smith (D-Wash) definitively linked the detention bed quota to
corporate profits, stating, “Frankly, I think if you eliminate the bed
mandate, that’s the first step toward eliminating privatization, because
that’s a huge thing that’s driving their profits.”92
1. Contractual Occupancy Rate Guarantees
Occupancy guarantee clauses, also known as “lockup quotas,”93 are
characteristic of for-profit prisons in the criminal prison context. Since
2003,94 private prison corporations have promoted and operated
prisons under contracts with state and local governments which involve
occupancy guarantee clauses for the duration of the contract term.95 In
2013, three private prison companies in Arizona had contracts with the
87. See Hernández, supra note 70, at 1508 (“Collectively, from 2005 to early 2013, private
prison companies spent approximately $45 million lobbying state and federal politicians,
including key lawmakers who have advanced proposals that world have expanded civil and
criminal immigration imprisonment.”).
88. See Selway & Newkirk, supra note 53.
89. Id.
90. Torrey, supra note 76, at 904.
91. Id.
92. Roque Planas, Bed Quota Fuels ‘Inhumane’ and ‘Unnecessary’ Immigrant Detention:
Report, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2015, 6:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2015/04/15/private-prison-immigrant-detention_n_7072902.html.
93. Ghita Schwartz & Silky Shah, Ending Local Detention Quotas, Secret Perks for
Corporations in Federal Contracts and Profiting Off Jailing Immigrant Families, THE HILL (June
17, 2016, 2:12 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/283785-ending-local-detentionquotas-secret-perks-for-corporations-in.
94. See DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23, at 3 (stating that guaranteed minimums “can be
understood in the context of the private prison industry’s past instability and its successful pursuit
of guaranteed profits.”).
95. Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and “Low-Crime Taxes” Guarantee Profits for Private
Prison Corporations, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (Sept. 2013), http://www.njjn.org/uploads
/digital-library/Criminal-Lockup-Quota,-In-the-Public-Interest,-9.13.pdf.
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state that contained 100 percent inmate quotas, meaning the state is
contractually obligated to keep these prisons filled to 100 percent
capacity, or pay the private company for empty beds.96
A September 2013 report published by In the Public Interest (ITPI)
on prison bed occupancy guarantee clauses in the criminal prison
context analyzed private prison contracts between states and local
jurisdictions. ITPI identified seventy-seven such private facilities
nationwide and analyzed sixty-two contracts. Of those contracts, sixtyfive percent contained capacity quotas between 80 and 100 percent.97
Amongst the negative effects of occupancy guarantee contractual
clauses is that they “incentivize keeping prison beds filled, which runs
counter to many states’ public policy goals of reducing the prison
population and increasing efforts for inmate rehabilitation.”98 A related
consequence of these clauses has been called the “low-crime tax,”
meaning that since state or local governments have to pay corporations
for unused beds, taxpayers are effectively penalized when their
government achieves what should in theory be the goal of lower rates
of incarceration.99
Unsurprisingly perhaps, prison corporations have brought over
occupancy guarantee clauses to their business dealings with ICE.
Drawing upon data received from a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request, the advocacy groups Detention Watch Network and
the Center for Constitutional Rights published a report on this practice
in the operation of immigration detention facilities. The occupancy
guarantees function similarly to those in the criminal context, with an
additional feature called “tiered pricing,” in which ICE receives a
discount on each person detained above the guaranteed minimum.”100
The report states that the CCA was the first in 2003 to include an
occupancy guarantee in their contract.101 In the intervening years, these
clauses have increasingly been a part of contracts between ICE and
private contractors both for detention operations and detention-

96. Id.
97. Id. at 6.
98. Id. at 3. Other negative implications discussed in the report are dangerous prison
conditions, and the enactment of policies inconsistent with the public interest with respect to
criminal justice.
99. Donald Cohen, Lockup Quotas, Low-Crime Taxes, and the For-Profit Prison Industry,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-cohen/lockupquotas-lowcrime-ta_b_3956336.html.
100. DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23, at 6.
101. Id. at 3.

SINHA FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

3/6/2017 1:39 PM

ARBITRARY DETENTION

95

related services.102 The report also found that “although guaranteed
minimums are found formally only in contracts with private companies,
subcontracting . . . means that private companies can be involved and
minimums can occur in all three types of contract categories[,]
including public facilities. . . .”103 Today, out of ICE’s Enforcement and
Removal’s 24 field offices, half have occupancy guarantees.104 Beyond
the increase in the frequency and breadth of these contractual terms,
the occupancy minimums have gone up dramatically.105
The Detention Watch Network and Center for Constitutional
Rights’ FOIA request uncovered explicit evidence that ICE prioritizes
keeping the detention facilities with occupancy guarantees full over
those that do not have such contractual obligations. In an email from
two ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations headquarter officials,
local field offices were advised that “[t]he first priorities for funding are
the 11 [field offices] that have detention facilities with guarantee
minimum beds.”106
The prevalence and influence of occupancy guarantees in ICE
contracts with private prison companies recently gained the attention
of some Congress members. In 2015, House Representatives Deutch
(D-TX), Foster (D-IL), and Smith (D-WA) introduced “The Protecting
Taxpayers and Communities from Local Detention Quotas Act.”107 The
bill, which was not voted out of subcommittee,108 prohibits ICE from
“negotiat[ing] with a private detention company a contract that
102. Id. at 3 (stating that detention-related services can include contracting with companies
to provide security, transportation, and food).
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id. at 4. The report goes on to provide evidence showing that “[b]ecause GEO Group
has been the most successful company in getting guaranteed minimums incorporated into their
contracts, their facilities are often prioritized in order to fill local quotas.” Id. at 6.
105. See id. at 9 (“For example, the Houston Processing Center’s guaranteed minimum
increased from 375 to 750 between 2003 and 2008, and at Port Isabel Detention Center, the
guaranteed minimum increased from 500 to 800 between 2008 and 2014. Krome Detention
Center’s guaranteed minimum also saw an increase from 250 to 450 between 2008 and 2014. For
each, there is no publicly available information as to why such dramatic increases were
necessary.”).
106. Id. at 6. In another email, one of the same ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations
headquarter officials, then Acting Assistant Director for Field Operations, Phillip T. Miller,
emphasized to the field offices that they should “[e]nsure that all mandatory minimum detention
bed guarantees are being met and that any net cost benefits of tiered pricing or low cost beds are
being realized.” Id. The report notes that while ICE’s spreadsheet listed 11 field offices with
occupancy guarantees, the FOIA response showed that the New Orleans Field Office also is
subject to a contract with a guarantee minimum, for the Jena/LaSalle Detention Facility. Id.
(footnotes omitted).
107. H.R. 2808, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
108. Id.
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contains any provision relating to a guaranteed minimum number of
immigration detention beds at any specific facility.”109
During a press conference introducing the bill, Representative
Deutch said this about occupancy guarantee clauses:
As a businessman, I know that incentives can drive demand –
incentives like [contractual occupancy guarantees] create an
artificial demand for immigrant detention. While we continue
efforts to eliminate the detention bed mandate, ending these
prepaid detention contracts is one step towards making our
immigration practices more humane and fiscally responsible.110

Nonetheless, these contracts prevail in the immigration detention
system: As of June 2016, occupancy guarantees in contracts between
ICE and private prison corporations account for approximately 13,000
beds per day, or about forty percent of the detention bed quota.111
The affinity between the contractual occupancy guarantees and the
bed quota in DHS’s appropriations legislation is evident from this
exchange during a 2013 House Judiciary Committee hearing between
Representative Henry Johnson and then-ICE director John Morton:
Mr. Johnson. If [privately-run] beds are unfilled, is there is a
requirement that the Federal Government pay the private
contractor?
Mr. Morton. Yes. . . .We do our very best not to have empty beds.
Mr. Johnson. It is kind of like you want to fill the beds up so that
you will not be paying for something that you are not using. Is that
correct?
Mr. Morton. This is correct. Obviously, if Congress appropriates us
money, we need to make sure that we are spending it on what it was
appropriated for.

109. Id.
110. Press Release, U.S. Reps. Ted Deutch, Bill Foster, and Adam Smith Introduce Bill
Banning Local Immigrant Detention Quotas (June 18, 2015), http://teddeutch.house.gov/ne
ws/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398445.
111. Schwartz & Shah, supra note 93. The contracts between CCA and ICE for the “family
detention” facilities that were built to incarcerate the Central American women and children
seeking refugee due to the growing gang violence in the region include an arrangement where
“CCA is paid for 100 percent capacity even if the facility is, say, half full, as it has been in recent
months.” See Chico Harlan, Inside the Administration’s $1 Billion Deal to Detain Central
American Asylum Seekers, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/inside-the-administrations-1-billion-deal-to-detain-central-american-asylumseekers/2016/08/14/e47f1960-5819-11e6-9aee-8075993d73a2_story.html.
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Mr. Johnson. And so we got a guaranteed payment to private,
nonprofit [sic] corporations like . . . Corrections Corporation of
America . . . .112

The justification for occupancy guarantees, contractual and in
DHS’s appropriations legislation, appears to have less to do with needs
related to sound immigration policy than about private prisons’ profits.
2. The Momentum to Curtail Private Prisons
Because of practices like occupancy rate guarantees, the federal
government in the criminal justice system has begun to cut back on its
use of private prisons. On August 18, 2016, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) announced that it would begin phasing out the contracting of
federal prison facilities with private prison corporations.113 The DOJ
has directed the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to either decline renewing
private contracts coming to an end, or to “substantially reduce its scope
in a manner consistent with the law and the overall decline of the
[B]ureau’s inmate population.”114
Soon after the DOJ announcement, several members of Congress
have pressed DHS to follow suit.115 Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and
Representative Raúl Grijalva (D-Ariz.) sent a letter to DHS Secretary
Jeh Johnson calling for the agency to end its use of private detention
facilities.116 The letter highlights that like their criminal counterparts,
private detention centers, have significant problems, including higher
reported incidents of abuse and violence and less access to medical care

112. Torrey, supra note 16, at 7.
113. Phasing Out Our Use of Private Prisons, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 18, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/phasing-out-our-use-private-prisons
[hereinafter
DOJ
Announcement].
114. Id.
115. Mike Lillis, Sanders, Liberals press Obama to expand closure of private prisons, THE
HILL (Aug. 18, 2016), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/291925-sanders-liberals-pressobama-to-expand-closure-of-private-prisons. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), senior senator on
the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that the DOJ’s mandate is not enough and called for these
changes to be adopted by the DHS. Id.; see also Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy On the
Announcement by the Department of Justice Regarding Private Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016),
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/comment-of-senator-patrick-leahy-on-the-announcementby-the-department-of-justice-regarding-private-prisons.
116. Letter to Secretary Jeh Johnson (Aug. 22, 2016), https://grijalva.house.gov/uploads
/2016_8_22DHS_Private_prisons.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Johnson]; see also Chico Harlan,
Sanders, Arizona’s Grijalva Call for Ending Use of Privately Run Detention Centers, WASH. POST
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sanders-arizonas-grijalvacall-for-ending-use-of-privately-run-detention-centers/2016/08/22/f692f04a-6890-11e6-99bff0cf3a6449a6_story.html.
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than government-operated facilities.117 Secretary Johnson announced
that DHS will review the “current policy and practices concerning the
use of private immigration detention and evaluate whether this practice
should be eliminated.”118
Secretary Johnson’s announcement was met with internal
opposition. ICE and the Customs and Border Patrol have said that
ending private detention facilities would lead to overcrowding and
compromise the agency’s ability to ensure border security.119
Immigrant rights advocates critiqued the fact that the Secretary
announced a review in the first instance, stating that the agency already
has the information it needs to know that contracting with private
corporations is not good policy.120 Advocates and scholars also have
questioned whether the alternatives, namely government-run facilities
and ankle bracelet monitoring, are progress from the vantage of noncitizens.121 It is unlikely that DHS would be able to meet the current
immigration detention bed quota without contracting with private
corporations, and so at the very least a decision to end corporate
contracts to detain noncitizens could deliver the final blow to the
provision.
C. The Problem with Quotas Generally
The immigration detention bed quota is a stark example of the
difference between what is beneficial to corporate profits and what is
good public policy. The quota constitutes a “statistical approach” to law
enforcement, emphasizing more—instead of better—enforcement.122 It
also replaces systemic ways in which to promote public safety, such as
community policing, with quantitative measures of citations, arrests,
and convictions.123 And while the underlying motivation for imposing
117. Letter to Johnson, supra note 116.
118. Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on Establishing a Review of Privatized
Immigration Detention (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/08/29/statementsecretary-jeh-c-johnson-establishing-review-privatized-immigration.
119. Reuters, Closing Private Detention Centers for Migrants Could Raise More Problems,
FORTUNE (Sept. 9. 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/09/closing-private-detention-centers-illegalimmigrants/.
120. Reynaldo Leanos, Jr., DHS Will Review its Relationship with Private Prison Companies,
But There Are Many Questions About What Comes Next, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-09-01/dhs-will-review-its-relationship-private-prison-companiesthere-are-many.
121. Id.
122. Charles E. Lupia, Statistical Justice, 69 DEC. N.Y. ST. B.J. 16 (1997).
123. See id. (“[T]he results of this approach are at best temporary and unsatisfactory . . . [f]or
they do not seek out the roots of crime.).
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law enforcement quotas is to manage police officers who have
considerable independence, “meeting a numerical goal does not
necessarily have the intended effect on the targeted offense.”124
There have been numerous advocacy efforts challenging quotas in
the policing context, one high-profile example being the litigation
against the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) stop-and-frisk
practice.125 Moreover, arrest and ticket quotas are banned by law in
many states, including New York, Illinois, California, and Florida.126
Nonetheless, number-based policing remains if not explicitly, then an
unsaid but understood performance standard. As one former NYPD
officer put it, “[t]he culture is, you’re not working unless you are writing
summonses or arresting people.”127 The Police Executive Research
Forum (PERF) estimates that 18,000 police departments across the
country likely impose quotas on their officers.128
PERF’s executive director describes the problem with quotas this
way: “there is an understandable desire to have productivity from your
officers[,] . . . but telling them that you want to arrest x number of
people, you have to cite x number of people, it just encourages bad
performance on the part of officers.”129 A swath of bad performance
resulting from enforcement quotas is the disproportionate impact of
police contact and incarceration on poor communities of color.130

124. Nathaniel Bronstein, Police Management and Quotas: Governance in the Compstat Era,
48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 543, 556 (2015).
125. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that the stopand-frisk practices in New York City were banned, and when Bill de Blasio became mayor, he
withdrew the city’s appeal of that decision). See generally Rima Vesely-Flad, New York City
Under Siege: The Moral Politics of Policing Practices, 1993-2013, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889,
900 (2014).
126. Joel Rose, Despite Laws and Lawsuits, Quota-Based Policing Lingers, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/04/395061810/despite-laws-and-lawsuitsquota-based-policing-lingers.
127. Id. (including a statement from a former officer who described the quota as “20 and 1,”
referring to twenty citations and one arrest per officer, per month).
128. Id. As a stark example of such bad performance, two former Atlanta police officers
involved in a lawsuit over a public strip search claimed that “pulling down the pants of men in
hopes of finding drugs was necessary to meet their quota of daily arrests.” Id. Another undesirable
result of quotas is false arrests, and subsequent “dishonesty in the form of cover charges and
added falsifications to increase the likelihood of conviction. . . .” David N. Dorfman, Proving the
Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455 (1999).
129. Rose, supra note 126.
130. Lupia, supra note 122 (“[H]istorical racism and continued resultant poverty have caused
members of certain ethnic groups to have frequent brushes with the law. . . [and the result of]
increased convictions. . . has been the statistic of large number of poorer persons in prison.”).
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NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practice,131 tied to “productivity measures,”132
disproportionately affected Black and Latino men.133 Police officers of
color have claimed that quotas disproportionately impact them in
relation to their White counterparts, because they “are unwilling to
perform racially discriminatory and unwarranted enforcement actions
against the minority community.”134 Racial profiling has also been
identified as a problem in the immigration enforcement context. Much
of the advocacy and scholarship about this issue focuses on
enforcement against Latinos and, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, South Asian, Arab, and Muslim non-citizens.135 Another aspect
of racial profiling in immigration enforcement that is equally
concerning, but has received less attention, is its impact on black
immigrants. A report by the Black Alliance for Just Immigration and
the Immigrant Rights Clinic at New York University School of Law
finds that more than one in five non-citizens facing removal on criminal
grounds is black, even though black non-citizens comprise seven
percent of the total non-citizen population.136 The study also revealed
that black non-citizens are more likely to be detained and deported for

131. Former NYC Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s “broken windows” approach to law
enforcement, which prioritized low-level crimes, and former NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s
“quality of life crimes” with the same focus, were the foundation of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk
practice. See Ari Rosmarin, The Phantom Defense: The Unavailability of the Entrapment Defense
In New York City “Plain View” Marijuana Arrests, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 189 (2012).
132. Vesely-Flad, supra note 125.
133. Darius Charney et. al., Remark: Suspect Fits Description: Responses to Racial Profiling
in New York City, 14 CUNY L. REV. 57 (2010). In 2009 alone, [the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy]
resulted in over 575,000 stops of individuals. Of those who were stopped, 88% were totally
innocent of any crime or offense. Fifty-four percent were black, 31% were Latino, and 9% were
white.” Id.
134. Selim Aigar & Josh Saul, NYPD Set Arrest Quotas for Minority Cops in Their Own
Communities: Suit, N.Y. POST (Sept. 1, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/09/01/cop-suing-overminority-arrest-quotas-says-he-faced-retaliation/.
135. See, e.g., Aaron Haas, Profiling and Immigration, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 3, 12 (2011) (“The twin trends of criminalizing and localizing immigration enforcement have
created a situation in which local police are encouraged to target Hispanics for detention and
arrests. This kind of profiling has already been seen in the border areas, but, as the underlying
trend goes national, it can be expected that profiling will also increasingly be seen throughout the
country.”); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice’s
2003 Guidelines, 25 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 85, 86 (2004) (“The treatment of Arabs and
Muslims after September 11 offers a lesson from current events how easily race, national origin,
nationality, and religion can be abused by law enforcement.”); Sameer Ashar, Immigration
Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 12
IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 545, 552 (describing a client who “was amongst the 1,200 Arab and
South Asian Muslim men arrested and detained in the months following September 11”).
136. The Black Alliance for Just Immigration and The New York University School of Law
Immigrant Rights Clinic, The State of Black Immigrants (Sept. 2016), http://www.stateofblack
immigrants.com/.
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criminal convictions than other non-citizens group.137 With this context,
mandating that tens of thousands non-citizens be detained each day
seems particularly troublesome.138
3. U.S. Immigration Law’s History with Quotas
The other contextual lens that renders the detention bed quota
particularly objectionable is the historical use of quotas in U.S.
immigration law. The turn of the twentieth century in the United States
brought about a spike in immigration due to labor demands spurred by
the Industrial Revolution, and Congress responded by enacting stricter
immigration controls.139 One such measure was the temporary national
origin quota enacted in 1910, which had the clear purpose of
“confin[ing] immigration as much as possible to western and northern
European stock.”140
The 1910 quota was made permanent by enactment of the 1924
National Origins Act, which set forth a formula of determining the
annual allotment of visas contingent upon the number of American
citizens who could trace their ancestry to particular nations.141
Importantly, African Americans were excluded from the formula,
meaning that they were not counted for the purpose of granted visas to
Africans looking to immigrate to the United States.142 The 1952
amendments to the quota system, moreover, included specific
restrictions on “colonial immigration, which disproportionately
affected persons of African descent.”143
137. Id.
138. Esther Yu Hsi Lee, The Mass Deportation of Black Immigrants That You Haven’t Heard
About, THINKPROGRESS (July 26, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the-mass-deportation-ofblack-immigrants-that-you-havent-heard-about-4c291b0c5205#.fake96c80 (noting additionally
that in Fiscal Year 2014, the ICE agency deported 1,203 African immigrants). For more generally
on the plight of black immigrants in the U.S., see Andre Chung, Black & Undocumented:
Caribbean Immigrant’s Long Fight for Citizenship, NBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2016),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/black-undocumented-caribbean-immigrant-s-long-fightcitizenship-n557441.
139. Richard A. Boswell, Racism & U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After
“9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 324 (2003).
140. Id. at 324–25 (citing U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, The Tarnished Golden Door: Civil
Rights Issues in Immigration 8 (1980)).
141. Gabriel Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279 (1996).
142. Id. at 280 (citing Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190 § 11(d), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (amended
1952)) (establishing that “the term ‘inhabitants in continental United States in 1920’ does not
include . . . the descendants of slave immigrants”).
143. Id. For an in-depth discussion of African immigration to the U.S., see generally Bill Ong
Hing, African Migration to the United States: Assigned to the Back of the Bus, in PERSPECTIVES
ON THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965 60 (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuison
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The end result of the quota system was that migration from some
countries was highly favored over others, and the determination closely
correlated with race.144 Particularly, natives from England, Germany,
Ireland, and other Western European counties were favored and
migrants from Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe were not.145 Such a
systematic exclusion has been described by Professors Gabriel Chin
and Rose Cuison Villazor as “American apartheid.”146 President
Lyndon Johnson’s speech upon the passage of the 1965 Immigration
and Nationality Act heralded the end of “the harsh injustice of the
national origins quota system,” a result that would permit migrants to
“come [to the U.S.] because of what they are, and not because of the
land from which they sprung.”147
II. U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS WITH
THE BED QUOTA
The relationship between the government’s treatment of noncitizens and American constitutional protections is a topic that has
received considerable attention from the creation of federal
immigration law. Additionally, the relationship between international
law and U.S. immigration law, while complicated, is important from the
vantage of protecting migrants and refugees.

Villazor, eds., 2015).
144. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
“Magic Mirror” Into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1115–16 (1998) (positing that the
“use of quotas to exclude racialized peoples . . . evolved into more subtle forms of exclusion with
the transformation of racial sensibilities in modern times.”). For a discussion on the link between
eugenics and the immigration quota system, see Rachel Silber, Note, Eugenics, Family, and
Immigration Law in the 1920s, 11 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 859 (1997).
145. GABRIEL J. CHIN & ROSE CUISON VILLAZOR, PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965 3 (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuison Villazor, eds., 2015). See also
Jan C. Ting, “Other than a Chinaman:” How U.S. Immigration Law Resulted From and Still
Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 301 (1995).
146. CHIN & VILLAZOR, supra note 145, at 2. For a comprehensive account of U.S.
immigration controls from the 1920s to 1965, see MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2003).
147. Brian Soucek, The Last Preference: Refugees and the 1965 Immigration Act, in CHIN &
VILLAZOR, supra note 145, at 171. While the end of the national origins quota system lifted a
significant barrier to migration to the United States, it detrimentally impacted Mexican migrants.
See Jeanette Money & Kristina Victor, The 1965 Immigration Act: The Demographic and Political
Transformation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in U.S. Border Communities, in CHIN &
VILLAZOR, supra note 145, at 315 (“By placing a cap on Western Hemisphere migration for the
first time, it limited legal migration that had previously been virtually unlimited, at least in
principle.”).
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Constitutional immigration law is defined by Professor Hiroshi
Motomura as “the application of constitutional norms and principles
to test the validity of immigration rules.”148 There was scant guidance
as to this application because, while the Declaration of Independence
was considerably concerned about immigration,149 a decade later the
nascent nation ratified the U.S. Constitution with only one reference to
immigration.150
Early constitutional immigration jurisprudence, as a result, was
dominated by determining the allocation of immigration powers
amongst the three branches of government.151 In doing so, the U.S.
Supreme Court significantly limited judicial review over immigration
matters by giving virtually absolute authority, known as the plenary
power doctrine,152 to the legislative and executive branches.153 As
148. A term coined by Professor Hiroshi Motomura, “‘constitutional immigration law’ means
the application of constitutional norms and principles to test the validity of immigration rules in
subconstitutional form, including statutes, regulations, and administrative guidelines.” Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1990).
149. The topic was explicitly addressed in the Declaration of Independence, as “one of the
Founders’ grievances against King George was that he was limiting immigration, by trying ‘to
prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization
of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither[.]’” See Margaret Stock,
Immigration and the Separation of Powers, WASH. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2015/jul/7/celebrate-liberty-month-immigration-and-the-separa/?page=all.
150. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight. . . .”). Professors Legomsky and
Rodriguez also explore arguments as to whether the government’s power to regulate immigration
can be derived from the Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, the War Clause, or through
implied Constitutional powers (including as derived from Foreign Relations power). See
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 99–104 (6th ed. 2015).
151. See Stock, supra note 149 (arguing that the rationale for establishing plenary power
relates to the U.S. Constitution’s virtual silence on the subject of immigration); see also Adam B.
Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 466 (2009)
(“The text of the United States Constitution nowhere enumerates a power to regulate
immigration.”).
152. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUPREME COURT REV. 255, 255 (1984) (introducing the term “plenary power
doctrine” and critiquing the Supreme Court’s rationales for the doctrine). For insight into the
domestic and global climate in which the plenary power doctrine was devised, see Johnson, supra
note 144, at 1113 (discussing that the plenary power doctrine was created “in an era when
Congress acted with a vengeance to exclude Chinese immigrants from [America’s] shores”); see
also Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 349 (2002)
(“[T]he international context from which [plenary power] emerged . . . was historically
characterized by the proto-anarchical nature of relations among states and the resulting need to
centralize foreign policymaking in non-judicial institutions.”).
153. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 151, at 460 (positing that this articulation of plenary power
is indicative of jurisprudence that largely treats “the political branches as something of a singular
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articulated in The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chang Ping v. United
States: “The decision whether and how to exclude immigrants from the
United States represented a political question, not subject to review by
the judiciary.”154 Today, however, courts have shown less deference to
the government’s power to detain immigrants by upholding challenges
to indefinite and prolonged detention.
In the international legal arena, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General
Assembly after World War II, emphasizes protections against arbitrary
detention generally. Developments in international and U.S.
immigration law with regards to these protections for noncitizens have
been divergent. On the one hand, legal instruments prohibiting
arbitrary detention have extended the application of their provisions
beyond refugees and asylum seekers, to migrants generally. On the
other hand, changes toward criminalization in U.S. immigration law and
policies over the past two decades, including the expansion of the
immigration detention system, have created a significant schism
between the legal landscape for migrants under domestic U.S. and
international human rights law.
This Part explores the immigration detention bed mandate through
the lens of both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and the international human rights legal frameworks
addressing arbitrary detention.
A. The Due Process Clause and Detention
The plenary power doctrine historically has been an obstacle for
non-citizens making constitutional claims concerning the manner by
which the government seeks to remove them. This is due to the
groundwork laid out by early constitutional immigration jurisprudence.
Addressing the general applicability of the Fifth Amendment of the
entity”).
154. Id. at 467 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 609 (1989)). Professor Motomura defines the doctrine as establishing that “Congress
and the Executive branch have broad and often exclusive authority in immigration matters”
(without judicial oversight for constitutionality). Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1625, 1626 (1992). See also Abrams, supra note 9, at 601 (defining plenary power doctrine
as giving “the political branches special deference when passing or executing immigration
legislation, even where doing so would otherwise violate individual constitutional rights”); Adam
B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 375 (2004)
(discussing the plenary power doctrine generally from the viewpoint of citizens, rather than noncitizens).
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U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court in Ekiu v. United States held that
the due process clause does not override the plenary power doctrine,
i.e., that concerns about due process do not require judicial oversight
on matters of immigration.155
Two years later came the first of two early foundational decisions
on due process and detention. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,156 the
Court reaffirmed the Ekiu articulation of the plenary power doctrine
and upheld the government’s power to detain a noncitizen pending
removal. In doing so, the Court in Fong Yue Ting established that an
“order of deportation is not punishment for a crime,”157 and that an
individual incarcerated for allegedly violating immigration law “has not
. . . been deprived of life, liberty[,] or property, without due process of
law.”158 Professor Daniel Kanstroom describes the Fong Yue Ting ruling
as “impl[ying] that the [federal government’s] deportation power is
essentially limitless,”159 while noting that the Court modified this
proposition of unbounded government power in a subsequent opinion
a decade later.160 Even so, the plenary power doctrine remained a
virtual shield for challenging the government’s detention practices.
Three years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Fong Yue Ting,
and “[o]n the very day it upheld racial segregation in Plessy v.
Ferguson,”161 the Court handed down a ruling that limited the

155. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (“[T]he decisions of executive
or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process
of law.”).
156. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
157. Id. at 730.
158. Id. See also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1897 (2000)
(describing Fong Yue Ting as “the first case to determine that the source of federal deportation
power was the same as the source of the power to exclude.”).
159. Kanstroom, supra note 158, at 1897.
160. Professor Kanstroom cites Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), for limiting the Fong
Yue Ting ruling. Kanstroom, supra note 158, at 1897. Also known as The Japanese Immigrant
Case, Yamataya opened the door for due process rights to apply to non-citizens by establishing
that noncitizens who have already entered the U.S., even unlawfully, are entitled to more due
process than those excluded at a port of entry. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101 (stating that
executive officials could not arbitrarily expel a person “without giving him all opportunity to be
heard upon the questions Involving his right to be and remain in the United States”). In doing so,
however, the Court found that the decisions of administrative or executive officers acting under
their delegated powers constituted due process of law and were not subject to judicial review. Id.
at 102. Finding that the noncitizen had been afforded an opportunity to be heard, the Yamataya
opinion echoed the one the Court made in Ekiu, namely that the process given to a noncitizen is
the process due. See id.
161. Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 43 (2002).
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government’s detention power over Chinese immigrants.162 In Wong
Wing v. United States,163 the Court struck down the provision of the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1892 “which enhanced the ban against most
Chinese citizens and descendants from entering the United States by
imposing a sentence of hard labor for violating the prohibition.”164 The
Wong Wing decision also affirmed the right for the government to
detain non-citizens in conjunction with removal proceedings.165 It is for
this latter proposition, namely that detention imposed for
administrative and not criminal purposes “is presumptively not
punishment,”166 that Wong Wing has had the greatest influence over
modern constitutional immigration jurisprudence on detention.167 This
characterization of detention as administrative, not punitive, may be an
implicit reason for the tolerance of the immigration detention bed
quota.
The bed quota mandated by Congress since 2009 intersects in
several ways with the jurisprudence addressing detention and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Having laid out the
foundations of this jurisprudence above, the next sub-Part will explore
current trends in the jurisprudence regarding immigration detention. In
doing so, it will highlight how these developments implicate the
constitutionality of the bed quota.
1. Current Trends in Immigration Detention Jurisprudence &
Policy
Over the past fifteen years, and especially in the past few years,
courts have ruled in favor of detainees with respect to indefinite and
prolonged mandatory detention. Professor David Cole characterizes
immigration detention as preventive rather than punitive, involving
depravation of “physical liberty without an adjudication of criminal

162. See id. (“Chinese immigrants earned a rare win from the Supreme Court in Wong Wing
v. United States.”).
163. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
164. Sinha, supra note 36, at 9.
165. Specifically, the Court asserted that “detention or temporary confinement, as part of the
means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens, would be
valid.” Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235. The Court continued: “Proceedings to exclude or expel would
be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character
and while arrangements were being made for their deportation.” Id.
166. Chin, supra note 161, at 44.
167. This is why Professor Chin states that, “[w]hile Wong Wing held federal action through
summary process unconstitutional, in an odd way it has operated to enhance rather than restrict
government authority.” Id.
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guilt.”168 Professor Cole draws from this depiction of detention to
contend that its “use is strictly circumscribed by due process
constraints,”169 a position bolstered by the waning influence of the
plenary power doctrine over constitutional immigration jurisprudence,
particularly in reference to detention.170 So while the plenary power
doctrine historically limited judicial review of due process claims over
federal removal decisions, as summarized below, the judicial treatment
of the modern immigration detention legal scheme has been more
varied.
The modern statutory authority related to immigration detention is
organized, generally speaking, in three broad categories. Two are in
Section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which
authorizes detention during removal. The first, Section 236(a), states
that “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”171 The
statute provides for conditional release or a right to a bond hearing for
non-citizens detained pursuant to this subsection.172 The second is
Section 236(c), which is the mandatory detention provision for noncitizens detained on criminal- or terrorism-related grounds.173 The last
broad category of detention is authorized by Section 241(a) of the INA,
which confers authorization to detain non-citizens with final orders of
removal.

168. See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51
EMORY L.J. 1003, 1006 (2002) (“Immigration detention is by definition ‘preventive’ because the
INS [now DHS] has no authority to detain for punitive purposes.”).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 81, 99 (2013) (“For generations now, the plenary [power] doctrine has been widely
assaulted as an anachronism with little descriptive or normative appeal.”); Peter H. Schuck,
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 57 (2007) (“Despite the
plenary power doctrine’s authority, it has been assailed over the years by many academics and
defended, I think, by none.”); Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and
Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 369 (2007) (“The elimination of the plenary power
doctrine would be a welcome development in immigration law.”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten
More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
925, 937 (1995) (stating the plenary power doctrine is a “constitutional oddity,” “has never been
adequately explained” and it is time to “clean the slate”).
171. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 §236(a).
172. INA §236(a)(2).
173. See INA §236(c) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien” who is
inadmissible or deportable based on criminal or terrorism grounds, or deportable for a crime of
moral turpitude “for which the alien has been sentence to a term of imprisonment of at least 1
year.”).
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The first case bearing significant influence over the modern
American immigration detention system is Zadvydas v. Davis,174 which
Professor Peter Spiro characterizes as “set[ting] the doctrinal stage . . .
for the abandonment of plenary power.”175 The Supreme Court in
Zadvydas addressed INA Section 241(a)(6), which gives DHS
discretion to detain individuals with final orders of removal past the
mandated ninety day period.176 The issue before the Court was whether
the statute provided for indefinite detention for individuals who the
government could not remove. As Professor Farrin Anello notes, “the
Court relied upon basic due process principles that have become
crucial to courts’ assessment of whether there is any limit to mandatory
detention.”177 The Zadvydas ruling ultimately turned on a statutory,
rather than constitutional, analysis. 178 There, Justice Breyer, writing for
the majority, characterized section 241(a)(6) as ambiguous as to
whether DHS could detain individuals indefinitely, and interpreting the
statute as such would cause “a serious constitutional problem.”179
The following term, in Demore v. Kim,180 the Supreme Court again
considered the bearing of the Due Process Clause on immigration
detention, analyzing INA section 236(c), the mandatory detention
provision for individuals in removal proceedings.181 The Demore
decision brought back the primacy of the plenary power doctrine, as
the Court upheld the statute relying expressly on Wong Wing and “the
political branches’ plenary power over deportation.”182

174. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
175. Spiro, supra note 152, at 345.
176. INA § 241(a)(2) provides for mandatory detention of individuals for ninety days after
an order of removal becomes final.
177. Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration
Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 371–72 (2014). Professor Anello continues: “The Court rested
its decision [in Zadvydas] on the United States v. Salerno line of due process cases, making clear
that immigration detention was subject to the same due process limits as other forms of civil
detention.” Id. at 372.
178. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
179. Id. at 372 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690); see also Spiro, supra note 152, at 345
(“Zadvydas was by its terms not a definitive constitutional ruling; all the Court did, as a formal
matter, was to interpret the relevant statute as not affording the Attorney General the power to
undertake indefinite detentions. But that holding was grounded in the doctrine of serious
constitutional doubt . . . . It would take no great step to convert Zadvydas’ exercise in statutory
construction into a ruling on the constitutional merits.”).
180. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
181. Id. at 513.
182. Anello, supra note 177, at 374. (“In the brief majority opinion, the Court dismissed the
respondent’s due process claims with little constitutional analysis.”).
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Recent developments, however, pose considerable challenges to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Demore. One of these challenges throws
into question a factor relied upon in the majority opinion, namely the
average length of time an individual is detained. The Demore Court
“did not expressly discuss the constitutional length of pre-removal
mandatory detention.”183 But it did rely on what the government
contended was the average length of time to hold that “Congress,
justifiably concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not
detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their
removal hearings in large numbers that may require that persons such
as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their
removal proceedings.”184 The opinion stated that “the very limited time
of detention” was too brief to trigger Fifth Amendment protections.185
Recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ),186 compelled by
Freedom of Information Act requests filed by immigrant rights’
organizations, admitted in a letter to the Supreme Court that they made
“several significant errors”187 that led them to understate the length of
time individuals were held under INA Section 236(c):
Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s majority opinion relied on data
from the government to conclude that resolving deportation
appeals ‘takes an average of four months, with a median that is
slightly shorter.’ . . . The new estimate put the average detention
period at more than a year, or more than three times the four-month
estimate the Supreme Court relied on with the Demore ruling.188

The other set of developments from Demore involves significant
subsequent litigation on the mandatory detention statute. In one of the
cases, Jennings v. Rodriguez,189 which the Supreme Court is considering
this term,190 the Ninth Circuit held that detainees incarcerated for six
183. Bradley B. Banias, A “Substantial Argument” Against Prolonged, Pre-Removal
Mandatory Detention, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 31, 32 (2009).
184. Kim, 538 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 530 n.12.
186. At the time Demore was argued and decided, the immigration agency, Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) was under the Department of Justice, as the Department of
Homeland Security was just about to operationalize.
187. Jess Bravin, Justice Department Gave Supreme Court Incorrect Data in Immigration
Case, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-gavesupreme-court-incorrect-data-in-immigration-case-1472569756.
188. Id.
189. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 2016 WL 1182403 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (No. 15-1204).
190. The DOJ letter to the Supreme Court concerning incorrect data submitted for the
Demore case expressly stated that the data is relevant to the Jennings case. Bravin, supra note
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months pursuant to mandatory detention are entitled to bond hearings.
The Second and Third Circuits also have issued holdings providing for
bond hearings after six months.191 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit again
addressed the mandatory detention statute in Preap v. Johnson,192
holding that the government can only hold non-citizens under INA
Section 236(c) if it takes them into custody promptly upon their release
from criminal custody.193
There have also been significant developments related to noncitizens’ Fifth Amendment rights in contexts other than indefinite and
mandatory detention. Specifically, for vulnerable populations, there has
been successful litigation for mentally disabled detainees’ right to a
bond hearing.194 Immigrant rights’ advocates have detailed and lodged
formal complaints about the ways in which detained non-citizens have
limited or problematic access to lawyers and other ways to prepare
their cases, including guards creating unreasonable delays for meetings
between attorneys and detainees, and detainees lacking access to
phones and video teleconferencing (VTC).195 In response to a
complaint filed specifically about the Corrections Corporation of
America’s Stewart Detention Center, the company installed a VTC
system so that detainees, incarcerated 150 miles from Atlanta, Georgia,
have access to adequate legal representation.196

187.
191. Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d. Cir. 2015); Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County
Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3d. Cir. 2015).
192. Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2016).
193. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute, specifically the phrase
“when . . . released,” to mean upon release from criminal custody and not after the noncitizen was
released and resettled into the community. Id. at 1207. In the latter situation, the court held that
the noncitizen had a right to a bond hearing. Id.
194. See Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, No. 10-CV-02211-DMG (DTBx), 2011 WL 5966657, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that the Plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm and
the balances of hardships tip in his favor, that granting the Plaintiff a motion for a custody hearing
is in the public interest, and that the Plaintiff had exhausted administrative remedies).
195. Rhonda Brownstein, The Corrections Corporation of America is Blocking Immigrants
from Seeing their Lawyers at a Georgia Detention Center, HUFFINGTON POST (July 5, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rhonda-brownstein/the-corrections-corporati_b_10819892.html.
See also Abira Ashfaq, Invisible Removal, Endless Detention, Limited Relief: A Taste of
Immigration Court Representation for Detained Noncitizens, in KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TODAY 179–203 (David C.
Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas ed., 2008).
196. Immigrants Detained in Georgia to Get Better Access to Counsel After SPLC Complaint,
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2016/09/06
/immigrants-detained-georgia-get-better-access-counsel-after-splc-complaint.
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2. Implications on the Bed Quota
The bed quota mandated by Congress through DHS’s
appropriations bill since 2009 warrants scrutiny, especially in light of
recent jurisprudence placing limits on immigration detention.
Specifically, the judicial trend towards upholding detainees’ rights with
respect to prolonged mandatory detention can be applied to the fact
that Congress requires the agency to maintain 34,000 detention beds a
day. This is especially true in light of DHS’s stated policy of prioritizing
the detention and removal of non-citizens who pose “threats to
national security, public safety, and border security.”197
Moreover, as the agency demonstrated during the potential
government shut down in 2013,198 non-citizens who otherwise could be
placed on supervised release are being detained. Congress expressly
warned the Executive that these releases were a violation of the
agency’s appropriations terms when ICE officials were summoned by
the U.S. House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Committee in
2013.199 If the mandate is to fill beds regardless of whether the noncitizens should be subjected to detention, then the provision is squarely
in violation of the procedural due process test set forth by Mathews v.
Eldridge.200 Specifically, the individual interest is a liberty interest, there
does not appear to be any outweighing government interest in filling
34,000 beds a day, and there are no costly procedural safeguards at issue
here.201
In line with the recent case law concerning immigration detention,
there is also a compelling statutory interpretation argument to clarify
the meaning of the immigration detention bed quota. Currently, the
bed quota seems to be incentivizing at best, and compelling at worst,
the executive branch to detain more non-citizens than necessary and
197. These internal enforcement priority memos commenced in 2011. John Morton, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention,
and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf
/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. This policy was reinforced by DHS Secretary. Jeh Johnson,
Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and
Removal
of
Undocumented
Immigrants
(Nov.
20,
2014),
https://www.dhs
.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf.
198. See supra notes 70 and accompanying text.
199. See text accompanying supra note 71.
200. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Mathews’ balancing test weighs the
burden of the deprivation of an individual’s interest against the burden on the government of
affording increased due process, as well as the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable
value of additional procedural safeguards. Id.
201. See id.
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should be struck down under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Congress should be made to clarify that the DHS
appropriations language of “shall maintain” does not mean the
Executive must fill the beds. Whether this interpretation from a fiscal
policy perspective makes sense is a question that will be explored in
Part III.
B. International Law and Limits on the Use of Detention
Individual countries’ immigration law and international human
rights law overlap significantly. Some assert that while nation states
have sovereign power to regulate migration across their borders, “their
immigration enforcement policies and practices—including those
relating to administrative detention—must comport with the
requirements of international human rights law.”202 Professor Laura
Adams points out that “[i]nternational human rights law and domestic
immigration law . . .deal with many of the same fundamental issues,
such as freedom from detention and the right to due process of law.”203
While intertwined, Professor Adams lays out how the criminalization
of U.S. immigration laws over the last decades, including the practices
of mandatory and indefinite detention, has caused a “divergence”
between the two bodies of law.204
Nowhere is this divergence more evident perhaps than in the scale
of the modern American immigration detention system. With the
immigration detention bed quota at the helm of the mass incarceration
of non-citizens in the U.S., this section examines the bed quota through
the lens of international law and principles concerning the detention of
migrants. Scholars have applied international human rights law to both
particular aspects and the general use of the immigration detention
system.205 This section hones in on how the existence and application of
202. Eleanor Acer & Jake Goodman, Reaffirming Rights: Human Rights Protections of
Migrants, Asylum Seekers, and Refugees in Immigration Detention, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 508
(2010).
203. Laura S. Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship Between Domestic
Immigration Law and International Human Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 983, 999 (2002).
204. This divergence is particularly stark because, as Professor Adams points out, “[t]he
criminalization of migration in the United States has occurred at the same time that the United
States has accepted greatly enhanced international human rights obligations.” Id. at 985.
205. See, e.g., Azadeh Shahshahani & Ayah Natasha El-Sergany, Challenging the Practice of
Solitary Confinement in Immigration Detention in Georgia and Beyond, 16 CUNY L. REV. 243,
262–68 (2013) (discussing international treaties ratified by the U.S., regional treatises, and special
rapporteurs as challenging the practice of solitary confinement of immigrant detainees); Cathryn
Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: Immigration Detention Under
International Human Rights and EU Law, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 257, 261–63 (2012)
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the bed quota specifically may violate such international norms. It does
so by discussing the prohibition of arbitrary detention, as well as the
standards set forth for the detention of vulnerable populations such as
asylum seekers and minors.
1. Protections Related to Arbitrary Detention and Vulnerable
Migrants
International human rights law advances two general principles
regarding the detention of migrants: detention should be a measure of
last resort, and particularly vulnerable migrants should not be detained.
Professor Denise Gilman has analyzed in great detail the application
of human rights norms to both the fact and extent of migrant detention
in the United States.206 She notes that while the first focus for
international human rights bodies was the detention of refugees and
asylum seekers,207 more recently such bodies have extended the
applicability of international human rights laws to the detention of
migrants generally.208
The right to not be detained arbitrarily is a core right related to the
right to personal liberty, the latter placed at the forefront in the creation
of modern international human rights law with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).209 In tandem with the liberty
(addressing the dissonance between universalism and statism in understanding and advance
human rights); Gwynne Skinner, Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees
in United States, 16 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L. L. & DISP. RESOL. 270 (2008).
206. Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law to
Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 243 (2013).
207. See id. at 261–63 (“For more than forty years after the signing of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the birth of modern human rights law, international
bodies made little effort to analyze the application of human rights norms to immigration
detention . . . . [But then beginning in the 1990s,] international human rights focused on the
situation of refugees and asylum seekers in applying human rights norms to immigration
detention. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees . . . first formulated specific guidelines to
circumscribe the detention of refugees and asylum seekers in 1995 and then revised those
guidelines shortly after in 1999.”).
208. See id. at 263 n.81 (citing reports by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
Human Rights of Migrants). Other international human rights bodies have addressed the
American immigration detention system, but not specifically or in great detail issues pertaining
to the bed quota. See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES,
REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS 1, 8 (2010)
(“[T]he DHS report describes the ‘unique challenges associated with the rapid expansion of ICE’s
detention capacity from fewer than 7,500 beds in 1995 to over 30,000 today, as the result of
congressional and other mandates.’”).
209. Article 3 of the UDHR provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.” Laurent Marcoux, Jr., Protection from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention Under
International Law, 5 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 345, 345 (1982) (citing G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
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interest enshrined in the UDHR is Article 9’s specific prohibition of
“arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”210
Decades later, the United Nations adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).211 Article 9(1) of the
ICCPR establishes: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”212
Elaborating on this ICCPR provision, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee has established that “[d]etention in the course of
proceedings for the control of immigration is not per se arbitrary, but
the detention must be justified as reasonable, necessary and
proportionate in the light of the circumstances and reassessed as it
extends in time.”213
Detention as a measure of last resort for migration regulation is
another related overarching principle established by human rights law.
Also referred to by Professor Gilman as “a presumption against
detention for all migrants,”214 the principle of detention as a last resort
is articulated by international bodies such as the United Nations
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants. This principle is
particularly prevalent in the human rights law instruments related to
the protection of vulnerable migrants.215 Under U.S. law, asylum seekers
are amongst the categories of migrants and refugees subject to
mandatory detention. In 2014, ICE detained 44,270 asylum seekers,
representing a three-fold increase from 2010.216

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)). Article 31(2) of The Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which went into effect in 1954, prohibits “restrictions on
refugees’ movements” outside of circumstances when those restrictions are “necessary.” Skinner,
supra note 205, at 280.
210. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
211. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Mar. 23,
1976).
212. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35, at 7 (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/G1424451.pdf.
213. Id. at ¶ 18.
214. Gilman, supra note 206, at 269.
215. An Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report specifically stated concern
for the fact that “vulnerable groups figure prominently among those being held in immigration
detention.” INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 208, at 35.
216. Lifeline on Lockdown: Increased U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers, HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST 11, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Lifeline-on-Lockdown_0.pdf. To
contrast, in 2010, ICE detained 15, 769 asylum seekers. Id.
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The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Detention Guidelines, for example, begins Guideline 4 by stating:
“Detention must not be arbitrary.”217 The UNCHR Guidelines defines
arbitrary broadly, to mean “not only unlawfulness, but also elements of
inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability.”218 It goes on to
establish that “[d]etention can only be resorted to when it is
determined to be necessary, reasonable in all the circumstances and
proportionate to a legitimate purpose.”219 There also are international
human rights legal norms in the form of Conventions that the United
States did not ratify.220
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The immigration detention bed quota is a significant yet littleknown impetus for the trend of mass incarceration in the immigration
context. As Representative Adam Smith noted, “[W]e simply detain too
many people, and the federal mandate [bed quota] certainly drives a
lot of that.”221 In the criminal context, the United States government
and society more broadly are meaningfully engaging the question of
how to curtail mass incarceration.222 The same scrutiny has not been
217. U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees, Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the
Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to
Detention, at 6, 15 (2012) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines] (“The rights to liberty and security of
person are fundamental human rights, reflected in the international prohibition on arbitrary
detention, and supported by the right to freedom of movement.”).
218. Id. at 15. The United Nations Committee Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free
from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile conducted an extensive study of the meaning of
“arbitrary,” and concluded that it encompasses more than illegal and came up with the following
definition: “Arrest or detention is arbitrary if it is (a) on the grounds or in accordance with
procedures other than those established by law or (b) under the provisions of a law, the purpose
of which is incompatible with the right to liberty and security of person.” Marcoux, supra note
209, at 366.
219. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 217, at 21. The UNHCR Guidelines are in part
interpretations of earlier proclamations as to the rights of refugees, such as the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, promulgated in 1954, the latter which prohibits restrictions on
refugees’ movements, unless such restrictions are “necessary.” Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, art. 31(2), Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
220. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(b) (Sept. 2,
1990) (prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and stating that the detention “of a child . . .
shall be used only as a measure of last resort.”).
221. Planas, supra note 92.
222. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Truth About Mass Incarceration, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 16,
2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/424059/mass-incarceration-prison-reform (arguing
that “just because liberals are wrong does not mean the status quo is right” to take the position
that while mass incarceration is not about race, it is still not good policy.). See also MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
(2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
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applied to the mass detention of non-citizens.223 This Part offers public
policy reasons to include immigration detention, and the bed quota
specifically, into the critical examination of the American mass
incarceration trend.
A line of argument against an arbitrarily high quota to detain
immigrants relies on the practical. A past DHS official has questioned
the quota along these lines:
Former ICE director Julie Myers Wood, who led the agency from
2006 to 2008 under President George W. Bush, said a congressional
mandate for ICE to maintain a minimum number of detainees was
a reasonable guideline at the outset of her tenure, when the Border
Patrol was making more than a million arrests per year. But today,
she said, ‘it doesn’t make sense.’224

Wood’s statement highlights how the number of detention beds
that make up the bed quota does not correlate to needs assessment.
Another practical reason is fiscal, including more cost effective
ways to ensure that non-citizens in removal proceedings do not
abscond. There are also normative arguments against the bed quota, a
significant one being the importance of prosecutorial discretion in
enforcing immigration law. And while shifting institutional behavior is
a significant undertaking, there is compelling cause to do exactly that
for immigration detention policy-making. This Part will explore these
three arguments.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutorial discretion has been an important element of
immigration enforcement, and DHS during the Obama Administration
223. See Anita Sinha, Ending Mass Incarceration, But Not for Immigrants: A Tale of Two
Policies, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anita-sinha/endingmass-incarceration-but-not-for-immigrants_b_7874750.html (“Conspicuously absent from this
conversation, however, is the fact that immigration detention is now the ‘largest mass
incarceration movement in U.S. history’”). The one exception is the current review called by the
DHS Secretary on the use of private prison corporations in the operation of the detention
facilities, following the DOJ announcement that the government will stop using private
companies for prisons and jails. See supra text accompanying notes 93–112.
224. Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH. POST
(Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigrationdetention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html. According to
the Pew Research Center, there has been a decrease in unauthorized immigration into the United
States since the “Great Recession” of 2007-2009. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW
RESEARCH CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION STABLE FOR HALF A DECADE
(2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/22/unauthorized-immigrant-populationstable-for-half-a-decade/.
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has emphasized its importance. Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, in
her book Beyond Deportation, states: “A favorable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law identifies the agency’s
authority to refrain from asserting the full scope of the agency’s
enforcement authority in a particular case.”225 This articulation of
discretion in immigration enforcement presents how the Congressional
bed quota may be in tension with the Executive’s authority to detain
and removal noncitizens.
Prosecutorial discretion “has its historical underpinnings in the
executive branch’s authority, both implicit and explicit, to determine
which individuals, who otherwise have no valid immigration status, may
remain in the United States.”226 It was a tool emphasized by the
General Counsel in 1976 of then-Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS).227 From this time to the present, the discretion whether
to arrest, detain, and remove a non-citizen from the United States was
presented as being grounded in both economic and humanitarian
concerns.228
With a significantly overburdened immigration enforcement and
court system today, prosecutorial discretion has taken on renewed
importance. Former ICE director John Morton issued guidance in 2011
on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as a way to encourage field
offices to use it in individual matters, and described its importance this
way:
ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement personnel, detention
space, and removal assets to ensure that the aliens it removes
represent, as much as reasonably possible, the agency’s enforcement
priorities, namely the promotion of national security, border
security, public safety, and the integrity of the immigration system.229

225. WADHIA, supra note 19, at 7.
226. Erin Corcoran, Seek Justice, Not Just Deportation: How to Improve Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Law, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 134–35 (2014).
227. Madison Burga & Angelina Lerma, The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Immigration Context After the 2013 ICE Directive: Families are Still Being Torn Apart, 42 W. ST.
L. REV. 25, 29 (2014); see also Maria A. Fufidio, Note, “You May Say I’m a Dreamer, but I’m not
the Only One”: Categorical Prosecutorial Discretion and its Consequences for US Immigration
Law, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 976, 986 (2013) (“[I]mmigration officials have been granting
discretionary relief from deportation to immigrants prior to the formal recognition of this practice
in the mid-1970s.”).
228. See Burga & Lerma, supra note 227, at 30 (discussing the two principles of economic
constraints and humanitarian concerns in using prosecutorial discretion).
229. JOHN MORTON, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENF’T, EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION CONSISTENT WITH THE CIVIL IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES OF THE AGENCY FOR THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND
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Professor Wadhia echoes this economic justification in the form of
limited government resources as one of the theories animating
prosecutorial discretion.230 Harkening back to the articulation made
over 40 years ago, Wadhia also presents the humanitarian purpose of
prosecutorial discretion, namely not apprehending, detaining, or
removing individuals who violated immigration law but otherwise have
redeeming equities or who may be victims of crimes or disasters.231
As highlighted by the DACA and DAPA programs, the Executive
has exercised prosecutorial discretion for groups, in addition to using it
to make individual determinations. As discussed in the Introduction,232
with the United States v. Texas judicial impasse the role of prosecutorial
discretion for the former use is still an open question. However, these
legal challenges do not implicate the long-standing principle that the
Executive has discretion over whether to detain and pursue removal
on a case-by-case basis. It is in this latter realm on which the
Congressional bed quota appears to be encroaching.
B. Alternatives to Detention
Institutional confinement of non-citizens in removal proceedings is
not the only way to ensure that they do not abscond. There are
community-based Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”), which include
electronic monitoring such as wearing ankle bracelets, check-ins with
DHS, and curfews.233 In 2004, ICE created the Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program (ISAP) as for low priority non-citizens in
removal proceedings, and have initiated other programs over the
years.234 ATD has been recommended for vulnerable populations, such
as LGBT detainees.235 The financial cost of the U.S. federal government
detaining non-citizens during their removal proceedings as opposed to
REMOVAL OF ALIENS (2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretion-memo.pdf.
230. WADHIA, supra note 19, at 8.
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
233. Torrey, supra note 16, at 6.
234. Maria Mendoza, A System in Need of Repair: The Inhumane Treatment of Detainees In
the U.S. Immigration Detention System, 41 N.C. J. INT’L LAW 405, 445 (2016) (“In 2007, ICE
introduced the Enhanced Supervision/Reporting Program (‘ESR’), which uses several of the
same procedures as ISAP, in addition to supervisory tools such as residence verification. At
present, ‘ISAP and ESR . . . can supervise 6,000 and 7,000 individuals, respectively.’”).
235. See Shana Tabak & Rachel Levitan, LGBTI Migrants in Immigration Detention: A
Global Perspective, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 44 (2014) (“Ultimately, states should heed the
recommendations by UNHCR . . . by providing alternatives to detention for all self-identifying
sexual minorities.”).
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using an ATD is significant: Immigration detention costs taxpayers
about $160 per person, per day; ATD costs anywhere from 17 cents to
about $18 per person, per day.236
The conservative research institute Center for Immigration Studies
has described the purpose of Congress’ immigration bed quota as
“ensur[ing] that ICE is doing its job of facilitating suspected removable
aliens’ appearance in immigration court, and if applicable, compliance
with removal orders.”237 ATD, however, have been proven to be as
effective as detention in achieving these objectives. Non-citizens who
participated in one ATD study demonstrated a 91 percent success rate
for appearing at all their court hearings, with asylum seekers at a
slightly higher rate of 93 percent.238 According to Human Rights First,
in Fiscal Year 2014 participants of ISAP had a 99 percent appearance
rate for their final removal hearing.239
The Obama Administration, for Fiscal Year 2016, requested from
Congress increased funding for its ATD programs.240 In response, the
Chair of the House Commerce-Justice-Science Subcommittee, John
Culberson, raised the immigration detention bed quota, stating that an
“increased use of alternative methods does not mean Congress should
step back from its bed quota.”241 This statement is at odds with an
underlying purpose of ATD programs, which is to spend less money on
brick and mortar detention. Representative Culberson’s statement is in
line with the argument that the bed quota is a “message to ICE that its
policy should favor detaining a large number of aliens regardless of
whether that detention makes sense from an economic or security
236. LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERV., ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION:
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND (2013), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/LIRS-Backgr
ounder-on-Alternatives-to-Detention-12-6-13.pdf.
237. Eric Brickenstein, Making Bail and Melting Ice, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 229, 230
(2015) (citing Jessica Vaughan, Enforcement Metrics Support Case for Detention Bed Mandate,
CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Nov. 24, 2013), http://cis.org/vaughan/enforcement-metricssupport-case-detention-bed-mandate)).
238. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT REPORT: WITH LIBERTY
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES,
at 65 (Sept. 2015), http://usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf. See also Mark
Noferi, Making Civil Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil
Detention Paradigm, 27 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 533, 569 (2014) (“Immigration detention has the
dual goal of preventing flight before deportation, which can be adequately addressed through less
restrictive measures than incarceration.”).
239. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: HOW CAN THE GOVERNMENT
CUT COSTS?, (2013), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/immigration-detention-factsheet-jan-2013.pdf.
240. Chacko, supra note 30.
241. Id.
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perspective.”242 This implication, however, does not comport with what
is in the best interest of society.
C. Shifting Institutional Behavior
As with the scaling back of mass incarceration in the criminal
justice context, ensuring that the detention of non-citizens in the
United States is in line with sound public policy will require
considerable changes, including contending with the role of profitdriven stakeholders. Congress’ inclusion of a daily quota of 34,000 beds
in DHS’s appropriations has fueled institutional dependency on
locking up non-citizens regardless of whether it is good public policy.
Professor César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández describes the
immigration detention bed quota as indicative of a “path-dependent
approach to imprisonment.”243 This approach encompasses
institutional behavior where future decisions are effected by previous
policy decisions, and so path-dependent choices are particularly
difficult to reverse. In the criminal justice context, Professor Michelle
Alexander emphasizes the role of private-sector investment and prison
profiteers in mass incarceration.244 In the case of the detention bed
quota, “shifting away from imprisonment would require that DHS
empty thousands of prison beds that Congress currently requires it to
pay for and that it has made a habit of filling.”245
A shift after the November 2016 election results is not promising.
One indicator is the surge in the stock prices of the two largest prison
corporations, CCA and GEO Group.246 Security analysts attribute the
spike in share prices to the likelihood of policies that would “further
necessitate a sizable contract detention population.”247 This anticipated
new political climate may, however, alter the need for imposing a quota
on DHS, which could in the future help shift policies away from the
mass detention of non-citizens.

242. Brickenstein, supra note 237, at 240.
243. Hernández, supra note 70, at 1504.
244. See ALEXANDER, supra note 222, at 218–20.
245. Hernández, supra note 70, at 1505.
246. Tracy Alloway & Lily Katz, Private Prison Stocks Are Surging After Trump’s Win,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-09/privateprison-stocks-are-surging-after-trump-s-win.
247. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The immigration detention bed quota imposed by Congress since
2009 has been a largely invisible force behind a swollen system. As a
law enforcement quota through the Legislative branch on an executive
agency tasked with the enforcement at issue, it is unprecedented and
unmatched. The bed quota is becoming even more of an outlier with
trends in constitutional immigration law concerning the application of
due process limitations on detention, and developments moving away
from private prison corporations’ influence in the U.S. criminal justice
system. International human rights law and public policy
considerations contribute to a case for re-thinking the immigration
detention bed quota.

